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Kosovo	and	Serbia:	A	dangerous	but	not
unprecedented	Balkan	land	swap
Kosovo	and	Serbia	have	recently	discussed	an	exchange	of	territory,	with	some	commentators
suggesting	a	deal	on	a	‘land	swap’	might	be	imminent.	Andrea	Lorenzo	Capussela	writes	that	while
critics	have	rightly	decried	the	plan	as	a	redrawing	of	borders	along	ethnic	lines,	they	neglect	the	fact
that	Kosovo	itself	is	the	product	of	a	unilateral,	ethnicity-based	partition.	He	proposes	a	different
approach	for	understanding	the	issue.
The	crisis	of	Kosovo	is	three	decades	old.	Its	independence,	declared	in	2008,	did	not	solve	it.	Kosovo	is	recognised
by	neither	the	UN,	the	EU,	nor	by	a	wide	minority	of	the	states	of	the	world,	which	includes	China,	India,	Indonesia,
Russia,	and	many	states	that	host	separatist	or	restive	minorities,	such	as	Spain.	Mutual	distrust	still	divides
Kosovo’s	dominant	Albanian	majority	from	its	small	Serb	minority.	And	its	authorities	have	gained	hardly	any	control
over	the	northern	part	of	its	territory,	adjacent	to	Serbia,	which	is	inhabited	predominantly	by	Serbs	who	rejected	its
independence	and	live	in	near-complete	separation	from	the	rest	of	the	country.
Since	2008,	therefore,	EU	foreign	policy	has	devoted	most	of	its	energies	to	settling	these	problems	through
negotiations	between	Kosovo	and	Serbia.	Particularly	difficult	is	the	‘question	of	the	north’,	which	closely	replicates
the	question	of	Kosovo	as	it	stood	before	its	independence.	The	two	heads	of	state	are	now	considering	a
comprehensive	agreement.	All	or	part	of	north	Kosovo	would	be	‘given’	to	Serbia,	in	exchange	for	all	or	part	of
Serbia’s	remaining	Albanian-majority	lands,	which	are	contiguous	to	Kosovo.	In	parallel,	Serbia	would	accept
Kosovo’s	independence	and	open	to	it	the	path	to	full	international	recognition.
The	idea	was	floated	a	few	weeks	ago.	Both	parliamentary	oppositions,	the	Serbian	Orthodox	Church,	and	much	of
Kosovo’s	public	opinion	spoke	firmly	against	it,	as	did	most	analysts	(e.g.,	in	a	previous	EUROPP	article	I	agree	with;
some	rare	favourable	opinions	are	available	here	and	here).	Berlin	declared	border	changes	unacceptable,	and	even
Kosovo’s	governing	majority	seemed	divided.	Brussels	remained	conspicuously	silent,	however,	and	on	24	August
Washington	declared	itself	ready	to	accept	the	land	swap.	During	a	public	debate,	on	the	following	day	the	two
presidents	suggested	that	the	deal	is	imminent.
Most	objections	raised	against	it	are	convincing.	Border	changes	are	usually	dangerous,	especially	if	the	motivation
is	an	ethnic	one,	and	this	is	particularly	true	in	the	Balkans,	where	some	states	remain	fragile.	But	both	sides	of	the
debate	seem	to	forget	that	ethnicity-based	border	change	has	one	clear	precedent	in	that	region,	one	which	the	main
western	powers	engineered	and	many	analysts	firmly	backed.
I	refer	to	Kosovo,	naturally,	which	broke	away	from	Serbia	for	a	motivation	–	which	is	the	obverse	of	the	atrocious
repression	of	Kosovo’s	Albanians	by	the	Milosevic	regime	–	that	can	safely	be	described	as	an	ethnic	one.	The	2007
report	of	the	UN	mediator	for	the	Kosovo	crisis	is	quite	frank	–	perhaps	unwittingly	so,	in	retrospect	–	on	this	last
point:
A	history	of	enmity	and	mistrust	has	long	antagonised	the	relationship	between	Kosovo	Albanians	and
Serbs…	For	the	past	eight	years,	Kosovo	and	Serbia	have	been	governed	in	complete	separation	[for	in
1999	Kosovo	was	placed	under	a	UN	protectorate]…	This	is	a	reality	one	cannot	deny;	it	is	irreversible.	A
return	of	Serbian	rule	over	Kosovo	would	not	be	acceptable	to	the	overwhelming	majority	of	the	people	of
Kosovo	[Albanians	then	represented	about	90	per	cent	of	the	population].	Belgrade	could	not	regain	its
authority	without	provoking	violent	opposition.
No	matter	how	wide	the	autonomy	granted	to	it	may	be,	the	mediator	concludes,	keeping	Kosovo	within	the	borders
of	Serbia	is	‘simply	not	tenable’.	This,	next	to	their	own	broader	political	objectives,	explains	why	in	2008	the	main
Western	powers	chose	to	carve	out	an	exception	from	their	allegiance	to	the	principle	of	the	territorial	integrity	of
states,	the	authority	of	the	UN,	and	the	civic	conception	of	citizenship,	and	allowed	Kosovo	to	terminate	the	UN
protectorate	and	secede	from	Serbia	without	either	Belgrade’s	or	the	Security	Council’s	consent.
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‘Simply	not	tenable’	cuts	both	ways,	however.	Indeed,	a	double	partition	–	splitting	at	once	Kosovo	from	Serbia	and
the	north	from	Kosovo	–	would	probably	have	been	a	more	convenient	solution,	if	a	doubly	unprincipled	one:	once
one	opts	for	ethnicity-based	partition,	one	might	prefer	to	avoid	as	much	ethnic	coexistence	as	possible.	In	2007
informal	talks	on	such	a	solution	failed,	however,	and	since	then	the	West’s	and	most	analysts’	discourse	on	Kosovo
is	entirely	couched	in	the	language	of	the	intangibility	of	borders	and	the	civic	notion	of	citizenship.
Hence	the	criticism	of	the	proposed	land	swap.	But	if	a	unilateral	ethnicity-based	border	change	was	acceptable	in
2008,	why	is	a	consensual	one	unacceptable	in	2018?	This	objection	challenges	both	the	argument	from	principle
and	that	from	consequences,	for	the	Balkans	adjusted	fairly	orderly	to	Kosovo’s	controversial	secession:	why	would	a
lesser,	less	sensitive,	and	consensual	border	change	produce	worse	consequences?
Naturally,	even	though	the	supporters	of	Kosovo’s	independence	cannot	very	credibly	invoke	it,	the	argument	from
principle	remains	valid.	But	its	relevance	is	not	obvious,	because	Kosovo	never	gained	solid	control	of	the	north.
Under	the	effectiveness	principle,	which	is	arguably	the	only	basis	for	Kosovo’s	statehood,	this	might	imply	that	the
north	never	became	part	of	the	new	state:	so	what	is	generally	called	the	‘partition’	of	the	north	would	simply	be	the
waiving	of	Kosovo’s	claim	to	it.
As	to	the	consequences	of	the	land	swap,	critics	point	chiefly	to	dangerous	repercussions	in	Bosnia	and	Macedonia.
They	focus	on	the	likely	dynamics	in	those	countries,	however,	and	seem	to	neglect	the	fact	that	this	would	be	a
consensual	border	change.	This	is	a	valid	rejoinder,	but	what	does	‘consensual’	mean?	Both	Kosovo	and	Serbia	are
run	by	fairly	unaccountable	governments,	which	seem	to	fear	rather	than	desire	public	debate	on	their	policy	choices.
Without	popular	support,	an	agreement	between	the	two	capitals	is	likely	to	leave	a	heritage	of	mutual	recriminations
and	territorial	claims,	which	could	defeat	the	very	purpose	of	the	deal.	This	would	be	a	sufficient	reason	to	oppose	it,
even	before	one	considers	the	regional	repercussions.
Inversely,	if	the	deal	were	put	to	a	referendum	in	both	countries	and	if	open,	reasoned	debate	were	allowed,	its
consequences	–	internal,	bilateral,	regional,	and	broader	–	would	probably	be	far	less	dangerous,	and	it	is	not
obvious	that	the	argument	from	principle	would	militate	against	a	land	swap	agreed	by	two	sovereign	states	after
careful	public	scrutiny	and	democratic	deliberation.	This	might	be	a	moot	point,	however,	as	neither	country	is	likely
to	meet	this	standard.
A	third	objection,	and	probably	the	tallest	one,	concerns	the	fate	of	the	remaining	minorities.	Kosovo’s	Serbs	are
gravely	marginalised,	in	fact,	and	the	same	is	often	said	of	Serbia’s	Albanians	(on	whose	conditions	I	am	not
informed,	however):	those	who	will	remain	within	the	borders	of	their	current	state	after	the	land	swap	would	become
even	more	vulnerable,	might	be	the	target	of	resentment,	especially	if	the	deal	is	not	backed	by	genuine	popular
consensus,	and	could	anyway	eventually	be	driven	to	emigrate.	Border	change	is	one	way	of	solving	the	question	of
minorities,	in	fact:	by	getting	rid	of	them	rather	than	by	including	them.	The	EU	and	the	West	have	invested	much	in
the	latter	solution:	opposing	the	land	swap	would	be	a	credible	way	of	insisting	on	it.
Besides	some	fundamental	international	norms,	to	conclude,	Kosovo’s	independence	directly	challenged	the	civic
notion	of	citizenship.	This	deal	would	compound	the	damage.	Kosovo’s	independence	may	well	have	been
inevitable,	as	the	UN	mediator	argued,	but	this	was	only	true	because	of	the	long	chain	of	atrocities	and	policy
mistakes	that	preceded	it.	This	land	swap	is	not	inevitable,	conversely,	and	by	refusing	to	support	it	the	main	western
powers	would	begin	to	mend	that	damage.	(Incidentally,	it	will	be	interesting	to	see	whether	US	support	for	a
controversial	idea	will	again	prevail	and	split	the	EU,	as	it	did	in	2008).
But	other	consequences	of	that	chain	of	mistakes	would	remain,	in	the	shape	of	a	state	lacking	international
recognition,	a	contested	territory,	and	two	marginalised	minorities.	The	rejection	of	this	deal	should	therefore	be
accompanied	by	a	revision	of	the	policies	hitherto	followed	on	these	matters,	whose	failure	largely	explains	why	a
land	swap	was	proposed.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Bundesministerium	für	Europa,	Integration	und	Äußeres	(CC
BY	2.0)
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